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MMOD Environment Models 
• Orbital Debris provided by JSC & is the predominate threat in low Earth 
orbit 
– ORDEM 3.0 is latest model (released December 2013) 
– http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/ 
– Man-made objects in orbit about Earth impacting up to 16 km/s 
• average 9-10 km/s for ISS orbit 
– High-density debris (steel) is major issue 
 
• Meteoroid model provided by MSFC 
– MEM-R2 is latest release 
– http://www.nasa.gov/offices/meo/home/index.html 
– Natural particles in orbit about sun 
• Mg-silicates, Ni-Fe, others 
– Meteoroid environment (MEM): 11-72 km/s 
• Average 22-23 km/s 
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MEM Environment for ISS 
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Cross Sectional Flux    7.258269e+000 /m^2/yr 
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2.181e+000 
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MMOD Environment Dynamics 
• Meteoroids consist of background sporadic flux (static), and streams from 
meteor showers (variable) 
– Occasionally, showers can turn into storms 
• Orbital Debris changes as function of orbital altitude, the rate of on-orbit 
explosions & collisions, launch rate, atmospheric drag/solar activity and 
other factors 
 
Note, Spatial Density is proportional to impact risk 
400km altitude 705km altitude 
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Debris movies 
• Debris fly-through 
• Iridium-Cosmos collision 
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 Orbital Debris Material Distributions - ISS 
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Growth of the Cataloged Populations 
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Long-Term Projection & the Kessler 
Syndrome 
“The current debris population in the LEO region has reached the point where the environment is 
unstable and collisions will become the most dominant debris-generating mechanism in the future” 
   – Liou and Johnson, Science, 20 January 2006 
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Hypervelocity impact effects 
• Even small MMOD impacts can cause a lot of damage 
– Hypervelocity MMOD impacts represent a substantial threat to spacecraft  
– Rule of thumb: at 7km/s, aluminum sphere can penetrate completely through an 
aluminum plate 4x the sphere’s diameter 
– A multi-layer spaced shield provides more effective protection from hypervelocity impact 
than single layer 
 Comparison of size of projectile to 
size of impact crater 
Damage from a 1.3cm diameter  sphere 
at 7km/s 
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MMOD Shielding 
• Several types of shielding applied to spacecraft MMOD protection 
– Whipple shields 
– Nextel/Kevlar “Stuffed Whipple” shields 
– Multi-Shock shields 
• Protection performance characterized by impact tests, simulations 
– Defined by “ballistic limit” equations (BLEs) 
 
 Al bumper 
Al rear wall 
standoff 
WHIPPLE 
 Al bumper 
Al rear wall 
standoff 
Nextel/Kevlar 
Stuffed Whipple 
 Nextel ceramic cloth 
 Kevlar fabric 
 Nextel bumpers 
Kevlar rear wall 
standoff 
Flexible 
Multi-Shock 
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Monolithic versus Stuffed Whipple Shield 
Weight Comparison of Equal-Performance Shielding 
 
  
Scale: 1” = 1” 
Aluminum “Monolith” Shield 
29.1 pounds per square foot 
Stuffed Whipple Shield 
4.5 pounds per square foot 
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These shields can stop a 0.5” diameter aluminum debris 
projectile impacting at 7km/s, but the Stuffed Whipple 
shield weighs 84% less (94% if rear wall is excluded) 
and costs much less to launch to orbit 
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MMOD shielding background 
• MMOD shields typical composed of bumper(s), standoff, and rear wall 
(final protection layer) 
– Exclude multi-layer insulation (MLI) thermal blanket 
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Purpose: Breakup MMOD particle, laterally disperse 
resulting debris 
Key material & physical parameters (V ≥ 7 km/s): 
density, thickness to projectile diameter ratio, thermal 
properties  
MMOD particle 
(projectile) 
Purpose: Further breakup debris from first impact, 
slow expansion of debris cloud 
Key material & physical parameters (V ≥ 7 km/s): 
combination of first bumper and rear wall properties 
Purpose: Stop debris from MMOD & bumper(s) 
Key material & physical parameters (V ≥ 7 km/s): 
strength, toughness, thickness 
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ISS shielding overview 
• Several hundred MMOD shields protect ISS, differing by materials, standoff 
distance, and capability 
• Heavier shields on front & sides (where we expect most MMOD impacts), 
less capable shielding on aft, nadir and visiting vehicles 
Earth 
velocity 
direction 
Russian 
Segment 
NASA 
JAXA 
ESA 
colors represent different MMOD shield configurations 
JAXA 
Finite Element model 
(FEM) used in ISS 
MMOD risk 
assessments 
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MMOD directionality 
• The Long-Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) [1984-1990] provided the first 
detailed assessment of small particle debris in low Earth orbit 
– LDEF maintained its orientation relative to the velocity vector, Earth/Space for its entire 
mission 
• Over 30,000 observable MMOD strikes were identified on the exterior of 
LDEF (damage diameter ≥ 0.3mm) 
• Of these MMOD impacts, approximately 20x more impacts were found on 
the forward face relative to the aft face, and 200x more on the forward than 
Earth 
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ISS “Stuffed Whipple” Shielding 
• US, JAXA and ESA employ “Stuffed Whipple” shielding on the areas of their 
modules exposed to greatest amount of orbital debris & meteoroids impacts 
• Nextel and Kevlar materials used in the intermediate bumper 
• shielding capable of defeating 1.3cm diameter aluminum sphere at 7 km/s, normal impact 
NASA configuration JAXA configuration ESA configuration 
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Al Mesh 
(Typical Configurations Illustrated) 
Typically, bumpers are Al 6061-T6, rear walls are Al 2219-T87 or Al 2219-T851 
Kevlar 29 style 710 or Kevlar KM2 style 705 fabric are typically used 
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Shielding materials 
• Nextel (3M Inc. trade mark): fabric consisting of alumina-boria-silica 
ceramic fibers 
– Other ceramic and glass fabrics tested, and will provide adequate MMOD protection 
(substitute equal mass for Nextel) 
• Kevlar aramid fabric: highest hypervelocity protection performance found 
using Kevlar KM2 fabrics 
– Other high-strength to weight materials incorporated in MMOD shields include 
Spectra, Vectran, carbon fabric and carbon-composites 
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FGB and Service Module (SM) 
Mesh & Multi-Shock MMOD Shields 
• Majority of FGB shields include 2 or more bumpers spaced in front of the module 
pressure shell or propellant tank wall (superior to single bumper shields) 
• Metal mesh layers provide additional protection in many FGB shields (a mesh causes greater spread to the 
debris cloud resulting from high velocity collision) 
• SM augmentation shields rely on multi-shock ceramic fabric layers 
• FGB shields & SM augmentation shields provide protection from 1-1.5cm diameter 
aluminum projectiles (typical).   
• Unaugmented SM shields protect from ~0.3cm aluminum projectiles (typical) 
FGB Zone 11c,d,f SM deployable shield/zone 6 
orientation of zone 8 not parallel to 4 augmentation bumpers  
0.3/10/1.5mm Al honeycomb 
MLI 
steel mesh (2) 
fabric (1) 
1.4mm Al 
pressure shell 
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ISS Service Module Shielding 
• Service Module (SM) identified as high 
penetration risk using Bumper risk analysis 
– large cone region 
– forward sides of small diameter cylinder 
• Shields designed and tested, EVA installed 
– 23 augmentation shields for the cone region 
– 5 augmentation shields for the cylinder region 
• 28 shields reduced SM MMOD risk by 30% 
Original Zone 8 MLI Thermal Blanket 
0.5/10/0.5mm graphite-epoxy honeycomb 
2mm Al pressure shell 
2 
cm
 
1mm Al 
Corrugated 0.5mm Al 
Russian “Kevlar” fabric (6) 1
0 
cm
 
3mm Fiberglass panel 
EVA Installation 23 “conformal” panels on cone region 5 panels on small diameter cylinder 
SM “conformal” 
augmentation shield 
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Docking Compartment (DC) MMOD Shield 
& Performance Capability  
Typical DC Shield 
(Whipple shield with MLI thermal blankets) 
BUMPER Code Finite 
Element Model 
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DC-1 Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) and HVI Test Data 
Shield Failure expected above curves 
Open symbols = no-failure data  
Closed symbols = shield  failure data 
0.1cm Aluminum AMG6 bumper 
MLI 
1.7cm
 
0.4cm Aluminum AMG6 pressure shell 
MLI 
Ballistic Limit of shield (typical): 
0.35cm Al projectile @ 7km/s, 0o  
DC 
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Foam sandwich MMOD shielding 
• Honeycomb core sandwich structures are used extensively on spacecraft 
• Honeycomb core tends to “channel” debris cloud and results in a 
relatively poor MMOD shield 
• Replacing the honeycomb core with a metallic or ceramic foam provides 
improved MMOD protection 
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Foam sandwich hypervelocity test 
3.6mm diameter Al2017T4 sphere at 6.2-6.8 km/s, 0-
deg 
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Smart MMOD shields 
• Implementing impact damage detection/location sensors is a high-priority 
– Successfully added wireless accelerometer sensor detection system to Shuttle to 
monitor ascent and MMOD impacts on wing leading edge 
– Other methods to detect/locate impact damage available based on sensors to detect: 
acoustic emissions, fiber-optic & electrical grids, piezoelectric PVDF film, impact flash, 
radiofrequency emissions 
– Working to implement/integrate impact sensors into MMOD protection shields  on next 
generation spacecraft 
Test article (2’x2’) with 
integrated sensors & 
piezoelectric sensor array 
4 channel  DIDS  
 
1.7” x 1.7” x 0.8” 
Distributed impact detection 
system (DIDS) 
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Shielding Summary 
• MMOD shielding capability influenced by both:  
1. Configuration – “standoff” (more is better),  number of bumper shield layers 
2. Material selection – ceramics/metals on exterior of shield, high-strength to weight ratio 
(fabrics & composites) on interior of shield 
 
• More information available (including many BLEs): 
– NASA TP-2003-210788, Meteoroid/Debris Shielding 
– NASA TM-2009-214785, Handbook for Designing MMOD Protection 
– NASA TM-2003-212065, Integration of MMOD Impact Protection Strategies into 
Conceptual Spacecraft Design 
– NASA TM-2009-214789, MMOD Shield Ballistic Limit Analysis Program 
– NASA/TM-2014-218268, Volume I & II, Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) 
Design and Analysis Improvements, NASA Engineering and Safety Center Report 
NESC-RP-12-00780 
– E.L. Christiansen and J.H. Kerr, Ballistic Limit Equations for Spacecraft Shielding, 
International Journal of Impact Engineering, Vol. 26, pp. 93-104, 2001 
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MMOD Risk Assessment Process 
• Process used to identify MMOD risk drivers, evaluate risk mitigation 
options & optimization, verify compliance with protection requirements 
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ISS Finite Element Model for MMOD risk assessment 
Block 7 (2017-2028) 
PMM relocated to N3f, add BEAM, IDA-1 & IDA2 
Progress @ MRM2 Progress @ SM 
Soyuz @ NM Soyuz @ MRM1 
Each color represents a different shield type 
37 
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Failure criteria 
• Failure criteria required for each zone of spacecraft that clearly defines the 
limits of allowable damage (or failure threshold) 
– Basis of impact tests/analysis, ballistic limit equations, risk assessments 
• Typically defined by Engineering & Program/Project (not by MMOD) 
• ISS crew module pressure shell 
– Typically failure is defined as detached spall or through-hole of pressure shell 
 
 
 
 
 
– Loss-of-crew (LOC) assessments for ISS include analysis of internal effects of 
penetrations, with criteria established for LOC due to fatal crew injury, hypoxia, 
fragmentation/explosion of pressure vessels (internal and external), and several other 
failure modes 
Damage Class C3: Detached spall Damage Class C4: Perforation 
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Failure criteria (cont.) 
• Reentry vehicles, crew return vehicles 
– Loss-of-crew (LOC) failure include: (a)  pressure vessel puncture and/or rupture 
leading to immediate on-orbit loss-of-vehicle/crew, (b) damage to thermal protection 
system (TPS) leading to loss-of-vehicle during reentry 
– Loss-of-mission (LOM) failure includes: (a) radiator/coolant leaks, (b) others 
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Hypervelocity Impact Test Results Anchor 
Analysis 
• JSC-KX plans and performs over 400 impact tests per year 
– Primarily WSTF two-stage light gas-guns up to 8 km/s 
– University of Dayton Research Institute 3-stage launcher to 10 km/s 
– Southwest Research Institute shaped-charge launcher to 11 km/s 
• Data used to develop and verify ballistic limit equations used in Bumper 
code on range of different spacecraft components and subsystems 
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Surface Coating Damage 
Carbon Substrate Penetration 
Rear-Side Spall Complete Penetration 
K.E. = 0.5 J 
K.E. = 4 to 7 J K.E. = 30 to 50 J 
P = 0.61 d (V cosθ)2/3 (ρp / ρt)0.5 
( V cos θ)2/3 ( ρp / ρt )0.5 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
3 
3.5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Surface Coating 
Damage 
CC Penetration 
Rear-Side Spall 
Least-Squares Fit 
RCC Penetration depth P = 0.61 d (V cosθ)2/3 (ρp/ρt)0.5 
Thickness to Prevent Complete Penetration tp = 2.3 * P 
Thickness to Prevent Rear-Side Spall ts = 4.5 * P 
0.24mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o  
0.6mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o  1.0mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o  
1” Hole 
K.E. = 3700 J 
4.8mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o  
Hypervelocity Impact Results: Reinforced 
Carbon-Carbon (RCC) Example 
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MMOD Risk Assessment Tools 
• Bumper Code – Perform penetration & damage risk assessments 
• MSC-Surv – Assess consequences of penetration for ISS: loss-of-crew, 
evacuation risk 
• Hydrocodes (CTH, Exos, others) – Numerical simulation of hypervelocity 
impact (virtual test shots) 
 Bumper Code CTH Code 
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Analysis Products 
• Ballistic limit equations, damage equations 
• Risk quantification:  
– Spacecraft damage and/or loss 
– Penetration of pressure shell – air leak 
– Crew evacuation 
– Loss of crew 
– Uncertainties 
• Requirements verification 
• Risk drivers – what area of vehicle controls 
risk, focus of more analysis and/or 
shielding modifications 
• Assess operational methods to control risk: 
– Flight attitude, altitude 
– Dock location, orientation 
– Thermal protection system (TPS) 
inspection/damage mitigation 
 
ISS Soyuz Penetration Risk Color Contour 
Red=high risk, Blue=low risk 
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Post Flight MMOD Inspection: STS-130 
Number of MMOD impacts Largest MMOD impacts 
Windows 15 craters 
W1, 4.2 x 3.6 mm 
6 R&R’s (W1,2,6,7,8 & 11) 
Radiators 25 MMOD damages reported 1 face sheet perforation 
Wing leading edge & 
nose cap 
9 MMOD indications 
(reviewed by LESS PRT)  
Panel 18R, 3.2 x 2.8 mm,  
max depth = 0.46 mm 
no exposed substrate  
MMOD impact on W1 1 mm 1 mm MMOD impact on Panel 18R MMOD impact on Panel LH3 1 mm 
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Post Flight MMOD Inspection: ISS 
MPLM Pump Module (PM) 
PM Adapter Plate Crater in PM handrail 
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International Space Station (ISS) MMOD 
Requirements 
• MMOD requirements are key aspect of providing adequate MMOD 
protection 
 
• ISS MMOD requirement (SSP 41000): 0.76 probability of no penetration 
(PNP) or better over 10 years 
– No more than 24% penetration risk allowed over 10years for all MMOD critical items 
which include crew modules and external stored energy devices (pressure vessels & 
control moment gyros) 
 
• No more than 0.8% penetration risk allowed on average over 10years per 
MMOD critical item 
 
• Loss-of-crew and crew evacuation risk assessments performed for input 
into ISS Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
– Risk informed decisions based on PRA 
 
• Requirements for functional equipment set on case-by-case basis 
(functional = failure does not lead to loss-of-crew) 
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ISS MMOD protection approach 
• Multi-faceted approach to mitigating MMOD Risk on ISS 
1. Robust shielding 
– ISS has best shielding ever flown:  US/ESA/Japan 
Nextel/Kevlar “stuffed” Whipple shields effective for 1.3cm 
diameter debris impacting at typical impact conditions 
– Augmentation shields added by extravehicular activity (EVA) to 
Russian Service Module 
– Upgrades to Soyuz and Progress MMOD protection 
– Redundant & hardened external systems; e.g. US Radiators 
2. Collision avoidance 
– Maneuver to avoid ground-trackable orbital debris (typically ≥ 
10cm diameter) 
3. Sensors & crew response to leak if needed 
– Leak detection, isolation, repair 
2mm Al 
MLI 
6 Nextel AF62 
6 Kevlar 
4.8mm Al 
11
.4
 cm
 
0.5” diameter hypervelocity 
projectile penetrates nearly 2” thick 
aluminum block, but is stopped by 
NASA stuffed Whipple shields 
which weigh far less (same as 3/8” 
thick aluminum) 
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Visiting Vehicle Requirements 
• Shuttle MMOD requirements were two fold: 
– Loss-of-crew (LOC) risk should not exceed 1 in 200 per mission 
• Driving loss-mode for LOC was MMOD damage to thermal protection system (TPS) materials 
leading to loss-of-vehicle during reentry 
– Loss-of-mission (LOM) due to radiator tube leaks should not exceed 1 in 61 per 
mission 
 
• ISS commercial crew transport vehicle MMOD requirements: 
– Penetration risk causing crew-module leak &/or tank failure while docked to ISS should 
not exceed 1-0.99999^(surface area_m2 * duration_years) 
– MMOD LOC/LOM requirements are derived from overall vehicle LOC/LOM 
requirements, and cover the risk to TPS & loss of vehicle during reentry 
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Shuttle MMOD protection strategy 
• Design improvements: 
– Added thermal protection to wing leading edge structural 
attach fittings  
– Added doublers to radiator flow tubes 
– Added protective sleeves to radiator interconnect lines 
– Added automatic isolation valves to thermal loops 
• Attitude/orientation selection: 
– Implemented flight rules to fly low-risk MMOD attitudes 
during free-flight 
– Flew ISS-Shuttle stack backwards after dock, to reduce 
MMOD risk to Shuttle TPS 
• Inspection/sensors in high MMOD risk areas: 
– Implemented late mission inspection of wing leading 
edge and nose cap for critical MMOD damage 
– Added sensors to wing leading edge to monitor for 
impact damage (ascent & MMOD) 
• Collision avoidance: 
– Collision avoidance from ground-trackable debris (10cm 
and larger) 
 
velocity direction 
Shuttle-ISS orientation during 
majority of docked flight 
Earth 
0.02” thick aluminum strips 
(doublers) added over each flow tube 
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Agenda 
• Micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment overview 
• Hypervelocity impact effects & MMOD shielding 
• MMOD risk assessment process 
• Requirements & protection techniques 
– ISS 
– Shuttle 
– Orion/Commercial Crew Vehicles 
• MMOD effects on spacecraft systems & improving MMOD protection 
– Radiators 
• Coatings 
– Thermal protection system (TPS) for atmospheric entry vehicles 
• Coatings 
– Windows 
– Solar arrays 
– Solar array masts 
– EVA Handrails 
– Thermal Blankets 
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MMOD Considerations for Radiators 
• Radiator flow loops are subject to penetration by MMOD 
– Radiators are large and will be impacted by MMOD during each flight 
– Radiator flow tube area is smaller, but still experiences MMOD damage 
– Leaks can result in degraded spacecraft function and early mission termination 
– Radiator flow paths can be hardened to reduce the risk of leaks from MMOD damage 
– Radiator interconnect lines also subject to MMOD failure, and can be hardened from 
damage by increasing thermal insulation, adding beta-cloth sleeves, thicker walls, 
increasing flexible braiding, or wrapping with Nextel/Kevlar  
• Radiator coatings typically either spall or delaminate around impact site 
– Silver-teflon (Shuttle radiator panels) delaminate 
– Z93 paint (ISS radiator panels) spall 
– Diameter of spall/delamination typically large compared to impactor diameter (4-15x), 
but area covered by spall/delamination small relative to radiator area, even for long-
duration missions (a few percent of coating is damaged over 10-30year ISS missions), 
therefore not likely to result in major thermal issue 
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Radiator coating damage 
typical hypervelocity impact test results 
HITF-07428 
0.4mm Al 
7.01 km/s @ 0° 
Delamination to 
Proj. diameter 
ratio = 12 
Silver-Teflon tape Z-93 paint 
HITF-07447 
2.0mm Al 
6.95 km/s @ 0° 
Paint spall to 
Proj. diameter 
ratio = 3.5 
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Issues: MMOD Damage to ISS Radiators 
• MMOD impact damages observed to ISS radiator panels during Russian EVA 
(June 2013) 
ISS036e011356  
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MMOD Damage to ISS Radiators 
ISS036e011356  
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MMOD Damage to ISS 
• MMOD impact damages observed to radiator panel during EVA-20 (Nov. 2012) 
ISS033e017859  
P6 Photovoltaic Radiator Torque Panel 
(NOTE: numerous smaller impacts not indicated) 
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MMOD Damage to ISS Radiators (US) 
• MMOD impact damages observed to ISS radiator panels (Aug. 2013) 
ISS036e037365  
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P4 photovoltaic radiator 
• Initial indication found on 6/30/2014 
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ISS PVR Panel Construction 
• 124” x 70” x 0.69” thick panel 
• Aluminum face sheet 
– Z93 white paint 
• Aluminum flow tube housing extrusion 
with Inconel flow tube 
– Evenly spaced 2.6 inches except 
outermost tube spaced 3.5 inches 
• Note, flow tube relatively thick wall 
(>0.05”) and in well protected location 
at center of panel 
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Shuttle Radiator Panels 
• Shuttle radiator flow tubes are located directly below facesheet and are 
relatively thin-walled (0.02” thick) 
• Shuttle flow tubes are more vulnerable than ISS radiators to MMOD 
failure 
Al Doubler  
(0.02” thick x 0.4” W)  
0.005” Silver-Teflon  
Type VI Tape 
F21 Tube 
FWD Radiator (Typ.) 
34 x 0.187” OD Tubes/Side 
15.1 ft x 10.5 ft Panel 
4 Panels/Vehicle 
0.011” Facesheet 
3/16” Cell 3.1 Pcf Al Core 
0.9” 
0.5” 
1.9” 
AFT Radiator (Typ.) 
26 x 0.236” OD Tubes/Panel 
15.1 ft x 10.5 ft Panel 
4 Panels/Vehicle 
0.005” Silver-Teflon  
Type IV Tape 
F21 Tube 
BEFORE MOD AFTER MOD 
0.011” Facesheet 
• Aluminum doublers 
adhesively bonded 
to Shuttle radiator 
facesheets over 
each flow tube to 
improve MMOD 
penetration 
resistance & 
decrease leak risk 
• Completed 
modification in 
1999-2000 across 
Orbiter fleet 
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STS-128 Shuttle Radiator Impact 
shows why adding protection to vulnerable areas of 
spacecraft is a good thing 
Image of MMOD impact into LH1 
Radiator doubler protecting flow-
tubes 
Crater diameter in Al doubler = 0.8 mm 
Crater depth = 0.58 mm  
Doubler thickness = 0.51 mm 
Simulation of impact after 2 
micro-seconds with doubler: 
crater through thermal tape 
(green) and penetration nearly 
through doubler (red)…i.e., 
similar to actual damage. 
Simulation of same impact after 
2 micro-seconds without 
doubler: crater through thermal 
tape (green), through facesheet 
(yellow) and through flow tube 
wall (blue)…i.e., leak would 
have occurred without doubler. 
• During STS-128, an impact occurred on center-line of a radiator doubler, 
which protects the Shuttle radiator flow tubes from MMOD 
– Impact crater penetrated through the thermal tape, completely through the 0.02” thick doubler, and 
damaged the facesheet below the doubler 
– Analysis indicates this impact would have penetrated the flow tube if the doublers were not present 
– Doublers added in 1997-1999 time period, to provide additional protection for ISS missions 
– Conclusion: Doublers performed as designed, preventing a radiator tube puncture 
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
63 
Radiator Hypervelocity Impact 
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Thermal protection systems (TPS) for 
crew return vehicles 
• MMOD risk to  thermal protection system (TPS) of ISS crew return vehicles 
(Soyuz, Commercial vehicles) is high 
– Concern is TPS damage that can lead to loss-of-vehicle during reentry 
– Issue can be mitigated by inspection and repair or safe-haven (not Program baseline) 
Soyuz vehicle 
backshell 
heatshield 
Descent Module 
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Thermal protection systems (TPS) for 
crew return vehicles (cont.) 
• TPS example: Low-density ceramic tiles cover backshell of Orion crew 
module 
• Impact penetrations into TPS that extend to bondline with substrate are 
limits of allowable damage 
Backshell tile 
• Typical hypervelocity 
damage: craters with 
“fingers” of higher 
density debris that 
extend beyond crater 
boundary 
• Inspection and or 
sensors could be 
used to find critical 
damage before 
reentry 
• TPS repair or rescue 
flight needed if critical 
damage found in 
inspection 
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Typical Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
Tile Impact Damage 
Tile Test HITF-7469  
projectile: 2.4mm (3/32”) diameter Al 2017T4, 7.00 km/s, 0o impact angle 
Side view 
Top view 
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CT Scans of Tile Damage  
2 1 
1 2 
3 
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TPS Coating Damage 
• Coatings on TPS can be important in reentry survivability 
• Example: Si-C coating on Reinforced Carbon-Carbon of Shuttle wing-
leading edge and nose cap 
• Coating damage was considered limits of acceptable damage for “hot” 
areas of wing leading edge and nose cap based on results of hypervelocity 
impact tests and arc-jet tests, as well as thermal analysis  
1.00” Ø hole          4.89mm 
0.50” Ø hole          2.75mm 
0.25” Ø hole          1.68mm 
0.12” - 0.99” Ø hole             1.10-4.84mm 
0.25” Ø exposed substrate (Test 6)    0.81mm 
0.19” Ø exposed substrate (Test 11)   0.69mm 
0.14” Ø exposed substrate (Test 5)    0.58mm 
0.09” Ø exposed substrate (Test 4)    0.47mm 
Failure Criteria 
Critical 
Orbital Debris Ø 
(7km/s & 0°) 
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Pre-Arc-Jet Test A308-9 
Model 2238 
Exposed Substrate: 0.25” x 0.26” 
Test Condition: 2700F/100 psf FAILED WITH SMALL BREACH (0.125”) 
RCC Failure Criteria “Test 6” 
Model 2238 (Front) 
Representative 
of  
Projectile size 
Post Arc-Jet Test (0.125” through-
hole) 
Test Notes: No surface activity until 
811 sec.  Small hole developed but 
arrested by glass flow.  Total test 
duration: 900 sec. 
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Window Damage & MMOD Protection 
• Spacecraft windows typically are multiple panes of glass/transparent 
materials 
– Thermal pane or debris pane 
– Redundant pressure panes (typical) 
• MMOD impacts on fused-silica glass creates large diameter craters relative 
to impactor size 
– Typical crater diameters 30-50x impactor diameter in HVI tests 
– Issue for pressure panes and for re-use of thermal panes (e.g. Shuttle) 
• Window protection: 
– Thermal panes for reentry vehicles, debris panes for spacecraft, exterior of pressure 
pane(s) 
– Shutters (ISS): US Lab window has single wall shutter, Cupola has multiwall shutters  
– Window materials 
• Fused-silica: conventional window material for both thermal/debris panes and pressure panes, 
brittle, good optical qualities 
• Polycarbonate (Hyzod): hatch window external cover 
• Acrylic: pressure pane alternative 
• Tempered glass (Chemcor): high-strength but very-low MMOD damage tolerance 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
71 
Observed Spacecraft MMOD Impacts 
Shuttle Windows 
  
Sampling of Shuttle Window MMOD Impact Craters 
(all displayed on same dimensional scale) 
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MMOD Impacts on Windows 
Service Module Window 7 Impact 
~7mm across outer crack features 
STS-94 Window damage observed on-orbit 
0.6mm deep, Al impactor 
• Window ports are exposed to meteoroid/orbital debris impact 
– Over 1500 hypervelocity pits identified on Shuttle windows and ~130 of these large enough to 
caused window replacement 
STS-59 Side Hatch Window Damage 
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Fused-Silica Internal Glass Damage 
• Internal crack studies performed by polishing the sides of impacted 
samples and measuring internal damage 
 
Back-lit Front-lit 
Test: JSC-120069 
Crater: 15.8mm dia. by 0.9mm deep  
Projectile: 0.4mm dia. Al, 5.24km/s, 0o 
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Test Results 
(Unpressurized vs. Pressurized) 
• Projectile Conditions: 0.8 mm diameter Al 2017T4, 6.9 km/s, 0o 
Unpressurized – Glass Unstressed Pressurized – Glass Stressed 
5cm 
5cm 
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Cupola Shutters 
• ISS Cupola have multi-layer Shutters that provide MMOD protection of the 
windows, when the shutters are closed 
Al Shutter Hat (0.2cm) 
Nextel AF62 (3 sheets) 
10cm 
Kevlar KM2 (14 sheets) 
Debris Pane 
(t=0.37” overhead, 0.38” sides) 
Redundant  
Pressure Pane 
(t=1.45” overhead, 1.00” sides) 
Primary 
Pressure Pane 
(t=1.45” overhead, 1.00” sides) 
Gap=2.5cm 
10cm 
2nd Al layer (0.127cm) 
Al 6061 Catcher Plate (0.25cm) 
1.3cm Al particle on 
Ballistic Limit @ 7km/s, 0o 
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ISS Solar Array Damage 
MMOD damage 
caused disconnected 
bypass diode, leading 
to cell overheat 
damage 
MMOD impact 
breaks bypass diode 
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Solar Array Damage 
MMOD impact breaks bypass diode causing overheat 
Front of Panel Back of Panel 
MMOD hole 
MMOD hole 
iss040e064550 iss040e064597 
Disconnected 
diode 
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ISS Solar Array Mast 
• Deployable structural booms or masts used to support ISS solar arrays 
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MMOD Damage to ISS Solar Array Masts 
• Elements of the solar array masts have been damaged from MMOD impacts 
• If critical damage to mast elements found during inspection, solar array will 
need to be operated under restricted/protect flight rules 
 
ISS038e006032, Nov. 2013 
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Hypervelocity impact tests 
• Mast elements have been hypervelocity impact tested and structurally tested 
to assess residual strength for ISS life extension 
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Handrail and EVA tool MMOD damage 
• Many craters noted to ISS handrails and EVA tools 
• Sharp crater lips have lead to cuts on EVA gloves 
• EVA terminated early on STS-118 due to glove cuts 
• Modifications to EVA suit and ISS EVA procedures necessary to reduce cut 
glove risk from MMOD damage 
Crater on ISS pump module handrail  
1.85mm diameter x 0.8mm deep 
Returned STS-135 
Crater on D-handle tool 
5mm diameter 
Repaired on-orbit during STS-123 
Tear in EVA glove 
(STS-118 EVA#3) 
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Thermal Blankets 
• Thermal blankets are typically light-
weight and easily penetrated by MMOD 
impacts 
• Toughened thermal blankets incorporate 
additional MMOD layers to improve 
projectile breakup and stopping 
capability 
– Additional data available in NASA/TM-2014-
218268, Volume I & II, Micrometeoroid and 
Orbital Debris (MMOD) Design and Analysis 
Improvements, NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center Report NESC-RP-12-00780  
Toughened thermal blankets with integrated impact sensor film 
Impact Sensor Film 
Impact tests 
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Concluding Remarks 
• Highly effective MMOD shields have been developed & implemented on ISS 
and commercial vehicles 
• Toughened radiator systems have been developed & implemented 
• Reentry vehicles are sensitive to MMOD damage and require combination of 
improved design as well as operations (low-risk attitudes, on-orbit 
inspection) to reduce MMOD risk: 
– Thermal protection systems 
– Windows 
– Radiators 
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BACKUP CHARTS 
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Progress CM Shielding 
30deg impact data for Aluminum and Steel Projectiles 
• Tests indicate approximately 2mm diameter aluminum projectile penetrates 
Progress CM shielding (creating hole in pressure shell), whereas 1mm 
diameter steel projectile penetrates Progress CM 
– Aluminum used with ORDEM 2000, steel with ORDEM 3.0 
– Risk increases substantially as MMOD penetration size decreases 
 
85 
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Ku-band antenna 
• An MMOD Strike was seen on the ISS Ku Antenna Gimbal Gear Cover. 
The image was captured during Mission ULF2 / STS-126.  
• Interior damage? 
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STS-120 Solar Array Wing (SAW) EVA repair 
was caused by MMOD impact damage 
During STS-120 two solar array wings were removed from Z1 truss and relocated to P6 location.  During re-
deployment, the 4B solar array wing was torn in two places, due to a snagged guide wire. The guide wire was 
removed and “cuff-links” added to stabilize the array. 
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Scanning Electron Microscope EDXA 
Evaluation of retrieved guide wire 
7 of 21 wires in the guide wire cable were broken, causing the guide wire to hang-up in a solar array grommet. 
3 of the 7 cut wires exhibited evidence of extensive melt at broken ends, indicative of MMOD impact.  
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ISS Service Module Shielding 
• Service Module (SM) identified as high 
penetration risk using Bumper risk analysis 
– large cone region 
– forward sides of small diameter cylinder 
• Shields designed and tested, EVA installed 
– 23 augmentation shields for the cone region 
– 5 augmentation shields for the cylinder region 
• 28 shields reduced SM MMOD risk by 30% 
High-risk (red) 
Low-risk (blue) 
Original Zone 8 MLI Thermal Blanket 
0.5/10/0.5mm graphite-epoxy 
honeycomb 
2mm Al pressure shell 
2 
cm
 
1mm Al 
Corrugated 0.5mm Al 
Russian “Kevlar” fabric (6) 
10
 c
m
 
3mm Fiberglass panel 
EVA Installation 23 “conformal” panels on cone region 5 panels on small diameter cylinder 
SM “conformal” 
augmentation shield 
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HVIT Team: HVI Testing  
and MMOD Risk Assessments 
Hypervelocity Impact Testing: 
• Objective: understand how a 
spacecraft surface and underlying 
structure “shield” responds to impact 
from an orbital debris or 
micrometeoroid 
 
• Inputs: impact velocity (mostly 3-8 
km/s), impact angle (usually 0o, 30o, 
45o, 60o), projectile diameter 
(aluminum, nylon, ruby, steel) 
 
• Product: a ballistic limit equation 
(BLE) that calculates a critical particle 
diameter that will fail the shield as 
defined by the specific failure criteria 
MMOD Risk Assessments: 
• Objective: use the Bumper risk 
assessment code to estimate the 
micrometeoroid and orbital debris 
(MMOD) risk to a spacecraft for a 
given set conditions. 
 
• Bumper inputs: 
• spacecraft geometry 
• altitude, inclination, orientation 
• start year, exposure duration 
• debris or meteoroid 
• BLE and failure criteria 
 
• Product: 
• MMOD risk results 
• Impact (NI, PNI, odds) 
• Penetration (NP, PNP, odds) 
• Color risk contours & VBETA  
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Hypervelocity Impact Testing 
Testing at WSTF: 
• 3,500 HVI tests completed 2004-2011 
• average 440 tests per year 
• testing performed on WSTF two-stage 
light gas guns (2SLGG) 
• range selection driven by projectile 
size, test sample size, and budget 
•.17-cal, .50-cal, 1” ranges 
• turnaround times vary 
 
JSC-KX Hypervelocity Impact Technology 
(HVIT) Team: 
• develops test matrix 
• completes test readiness review 
• prepares (builds up) test samples 
• ships samples and projectiles to WSTF 
• daily coordination with WSTF 
• performs post test sample analysis 
• documents test series in report 
• develops ballistic limit equations 
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WSTF Remote Hypervelocity Test 
Laboratory (RHTL)  
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WSTF Remote Hypervelocity Test 
Laboratory (RHTL)  
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WSTF .17-cal range  
.17-cal range: 
Projectiles:  0.10 to 3.6 mm diameter 
Velocity: 1.5 to 8.5 km/s 
Chamber: 3.5 ft diameter x 7 ft long 
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WSTF .50-cal range 
.50-cal range: 
Projectiles:  0.40 to 11.51 mm diameter 
Velocity: 1.5 to 7.0 km/s 
Chamber: 5 ft diameter x 8 ft long 
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WSTF 1” range 
1”range: 
Projectiles:  0.40 to 22 mm diameter 
Velocity: 1.5 to 7.0 km/s 
Chamber: 9 ft diameter x 30 ft long 
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.50-cal Test 
Pretest photo Post Test Photo 
Phantom camera impact video (67 kfps) 
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HVIT Team: MMOD Risk Assessments 
Bumper Code 
Running Bumper interactively (single run) Running Bumper automatically with scripts (multiple runs) 
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HVIT Team: I-DEAS Modeling Software 
I-DEAS Graphical User Interface 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
10
0 
HVIT Team: Finite Element Model (FEM) 
ISS MMOD Risk Assessment FEM 
(representing current configuration) 
ISS MMOD Risk Assessment FEM 
(representing configuration after MLM launch) 
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HVIT Team: Finite Element Model (FEM) 
ISS Mini-Research Module #1 (MRM-1) FEM Property Identification (PID) Map (partial) 
102 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Mini-Research Module (MRM-1) 
 MMOD Shield Type Map 
MODTYPE10 MODTYPE20 MODTYPE30 
MLI 
Aluminum Alloy АМг6 Sheet 
2.0-mm thick 
Basalt Fabric БТ-13Н Industrial Fabric 8353/11 
Basalt Fabric БТ-13Н (18 
layers) Industrial Fabric 8353/11 (6 layers) 
Basalt Fabric БТ-13Н (9 layers) 
Industrial Fabric 8353/11 (6 layers) 
Basalt Fabric БТ-13Н (NONE) 
Industrial Fabric 8353/11 (NONE) 
Aluminum Alloy АМг6 Sheet 
3.8-mm to 35.0-mm thick 
4-mm АМг6 rear wall (scaling 
factor=1.0) 
4-mm АМг6 rear wall (scaling 
factor=1.0) 
4-mm АМг6 rear wall (scaling 
factor=1.0) 
D.M. Lear JSC/KX 
Ref: A. Gorbenko, RSC-E 
MRM-1 MMOD PNP 
Assessment Report 
P41491, April 2010. 
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HVIT Team: Finite Element Model (FEM) 
ISS Service Module FEM Property Identification (PID) Map (partial) 
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HVIT Team: PID Table 
ISS Service Module FEM Property Identification (PID) Table (partial) 
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HVIT Team: Graphical Risk Maps  
“color contour” 
ISS Soyuz Penetration Risk Color Contour ISS ATV Penetration Risk Color Contour 
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ORDEM 3.0 Debris Model Graphics 
July 2013 Orbital Debris 
  
106 
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Test Results Summary CEV AETB-8 Tile Phase – 3 Test Series   
Test Number / 
HITF Number / 
Tile ID 
Shot 
Sequence 
Projectile 
Type 
Projectile 
Diameter 
(cm) 
Projectile 
Mass  
(g) 
Actual 
Velocity 
(km/s) 
Impact 
Angle 
(deg) 
Damage Measurements  
(mm) 
 
#1 
HITF09189 
1 Al 2017-T4 0.16  0.00597 7.13 0º 
Paint damage diameter = 15 x 16,  
RCG surface damage = 13 x 12 
  Entry hole diameter = 9 x 8 (0.35” x 0.31”) 
Primary cavity depth = TBD 
Max. penetration depth = 24.1 
Max cavity diameter = 20 (estimated) 
 
#2 
HITF09190 
2 Al 2017-T4 0.318  0.04704 3.64 45º 
Paint damage diameter = 24 x 20.5 
RCG surface damage = 21 x 15 
  Entry hole diameter = 17 x 14 (0.67” x 
0.55”) 
Primary cavity depth = 38.1 (tile perforated) 
Max. penetration depth = 38.1 (tile 
perforated) 
Max cavity diameter = 35 (estimated) 
 
#3 
HITF09191 
3 440C SS 0.1  0.00405 4.19 45º 
Paint damage diameter = 12 x 13 
RCG surface damage = 8 x 9 
  Entry hole diameter = 6 x 5 (0.24” x 0.20”) 
Primary cavity depth = TBD 
Max. penetration depth = 20.5 (calculated) 
Max cavity diameter = 12 (estimated) 
Hypervelocity Impact Test Parameters for Orion Tiles, Phase 3 
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ISS MPLM and ATA MMOD Impact Damage 
Inspected after STS-
131 mission 
Duration exposed 
to MMOD 
Number of MMOD 
impacts 
Largest MMOD 
impacts 
Multi-Purpose Logistics 
Module (MPLM) 
8 days attached to 
ISS, 7 days in 
payload bay 
75 impact craters from 
0.1mm to 1.5mm 
diameter 
1.5mm diameter 
through-hole in outer 
0.8mm thick Al bumper 
Ammonia Tank 
Assembly (ATA) 
7 years attached to 
ISS 
49 impact craters from 
0.1mm to 1.0mm 
diameter 
1.0mm diameter crater 
(elliptical) in an 
aluminum label 
MPLM perforation A3 corner 
panel (exterior) 
MPLM perforation 
(side view) ATA impact 
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Inspected after  
STS-135 
MMOD  
Exposure 
Number of MMOD 
Impacts Largest MMOD Impacts 
Multi-Purpose 
Logistics Module 
(MPLM) 
7.0 days on 
ISS, 5.7 days 
in payload 
bay 
64 craters between 
0.1mm and 0.7mm 
diameter 
0.7mm dia. crater in 0.8mm thick Al 
bumper 
Pump Module 
Integrated 
Assembly 
(PMIA) 
8.7 years on 
ISS 
PM: 36 impact features 
LAPA: 19 impact 
features 
PM: 0.8mm dia. perforation in Al tag 
LAPA: 1.8 x 1.8mm crater in Al handrail 
MPLM grapple fixture  
coating spall dia. = 0.6 mm  
Pump Module ID tag 
Hole dia. = 0.8 mm  
Impact 
Location 
